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125 
DANGEROUS CLASSROOM “APP”-TITUDE: 
PROTECTING STUDENT PRIVACY FROM THIRD-PARTY 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Kate, an eleven-year-old middle school student, is told by 
her teachers to bring a mobile device to class1 so she can 
engage in interactive teaching lessons during class through a 
free mobile application called “Take With Me Learning,” which 
tracks students’ progress throughout the semester.2 The mobile 
application requires the student to create a profile consisting of 
personal information including school, teacher, age, name, and 
email address.3 Once the student has access, he or she can 
 
 1 This would be considered a type of “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) 
program, which allows students to bring their own laptops, tablets, cellphones, and 
other mobile devices in order to access certain activities, such as cloud-computing 
services and mobile applications, provided at school. See Getting Started with BYOD, 
K–12 BLUEPRINT (2014), https://www.k12blueprint.com/sites/default/files/Getting-
Started-BYOD.pdf. Khan Academy is one common mobile application schools use to 
improve learning and gauge a student’s progress. See infra note 8. 
 2 See Beyond the Fear Factor: Parental Support for Technology and Data Use in 
Schools, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM 4 (Sept. 2015), https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/Beyond-the-Fear-Factor_Sept2015.pdf [hereinafter Beyond the Fear 
Factor] (stating that online services may be used by schools “to manage grades, 
attendance, class assignments, bus routes, school lunch programs, special education 
services, counseling, standardized testing, and the myriad other functions they provide 
on a continuous basis.”). The most common Internet practices include the use of cloud-
computing programs, online textbooks, and mobile applications. Cloud computing, or 
storing data “in the cloud,” provides a school with Internet-based email, word 
processing, and spreadsheet programs, allowing for anytime, anywhere access by the 
students, teachers, and administrators. Steve Mutkoski, Cloud Computing, Regulatory 
Compliance, and Student Privacy: A Guide for School Administrators and Legal 
Counsel, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 511, 512–15 (2014). Such 
platforms include Microsoft, Google, Edmodo, Amazon, and IBM. Id. at 515–16. Schools 
also use cloud-based services for language tools, online textbooks, and online tutoring. 
Id. at 516. 
 3 According to a 2012 FTC study of mobile applications and children, 89.75% of 
applications were intended for children in elementary school and younger. FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE 
DISAPPOINTING 6 (Feb. 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-current-
privacy-disclosures-are-disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf. In addition, “over 
75% of the apps that specified an age range specified one ending at 12 years old or 
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watch tutorials, take quizzes, play educational games, 
participate in forums, and access online textbooks.4 The teacher 
can monitor the students’ progress as they take various quizzes 
and complete certain tasks. The teacher can also view the 
questions students post on the forum. 
At the beginning of the school year, Kate’s teacher sends 
consent forms home with the children. These forms ask parents 
to give consent for any online activity their child might engage 
in throughout the year. The forms state that the parents will 
allow their child to access websites and applications, such as 
“Take With Me Learning,” for any educational purposes 
approved by the school. Kate’s mother signs the form and 
returns it. Three months later, Kate’s mother discovers from 
watching the news that the “Take With Me Learning” 
application Kate’s class uses is the product of a company well-
known for violating collection and privacy laws. The company 
has been illegally collecting students’ information, selling it to 
advertisers, and making it accessible without limitation. Upset 
that Kate’s information may be subject to identity theft, 
tracking, and targeted advertising, Kate’s mother contacts the 
school and claims that the school failed to inform her of the 
“Take With Me Learning” producer’s practices and reputation. 
She claims the school has violated not only Kate’s privacy but 
also her own right as a parent to control access to her child’s 
interactions.  
In response, the school references the consent form and 
explains that under the Child Online Privacy Protection Act 
 
younger . . . .” Id. at 7. Mobile applications have become a concern for parents because 
they contain advertisements, which fund the application to allow the user access for 
free or at a low cost. Joanna Tudor, Legal Implications of Using Digital Technology in 
Public Schools: Effects on Privacy, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 287, 311 (2015). The operators of 
these applications collect the user’s data and sell it to marketing agencies, many times 
without the user’s knowledge. Id. The data collected generally “includes phone and 
email contacts, call logs, Internet data, calendar data, data about the device’s location, 
the device’s unique IDs and information about how the user engages with the app 
itself.” Id. 
 4 Online textbooks contain hyperlinks to different websites, videos, and 
homework help sites that may not be covered by the online textbook website’s own 
privacy disclosures and policies. See DIGITAL TEXTBOOKS IN K–12 SCHOOLS, OFFICE OF 
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION ACCOUNTABILITY, TENNESSEE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
TREASURY, JUSTIN P. WILSON (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/Digital%20Textbooks.pdf. Online 
textbooks do create risks, however, with the compromise of young children’s data and 
personal information, and also for the loss of parents’ ability to exercise control over 
their child’s interactions. Tudor, supra note 3, at 327. 
Peddy.125-159.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/23/17 11:25 AM 
1] DANGEROUS CLASSROOM “APP”-TITUDE 127 
(COPPA) it is the responsibility of “Take With Me Learning,” 
not the school, to obtain parental consent when dealing with 
children under thirteen. Kate’s mother contacts the school 
board and asks why the school was allowed to circumvent her 
consent when dealing with a third-party operator like “Take 
With Me Learning.” She wants to know 1) why the school did 
not inform her of the application producer’s information-
collection practices and obtain her consent before engaging 
with her child, and 2) why “Take With Me Learning” did not 
take measures to ensure that the consent the school provided 
was verifiable.  
Contracting with third parties has become increasingly 
common in present-day elementary and middle schools.5 Those 
who qualify as third-party operators under COPPA’s 
regulations make up a considerably large group.6 School 
districts enter into agreements with such operators, who may 
generally be categorized as website and application service 
providers, to deliver services such as Google Apps for 
Education7 and Khan Academy8 to schools. Even though such 
applications facilitate a more efficient organizational structure 
 
 5 See Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who is Reading Whom Now: Privacy in 
Education from Books to MOOCs, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 929–31 (2015); PBS 
NewsHour: Why Digital Education Could Be A Double-Edged Sword (PBS television 
broadcast Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/videos/#176786 (discussing the 
privacy concerns in Miami, Florida classrooms as teachers begin to use more online 
applications and the harms that are present). 
 6 COPPA defines an “operator” as “any person who operates a website located 
on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains personal information 
. . . for commercial purposes.” 15 U.S.C. §6501(2)(A) (1998). 
 7 Google Apps for Education is a service provided by Google “in the cloud” to 
educational institutions. The service offers email, calendar, and chat, as well as 
interactive services like Google Drive, Classroom, Docs, Slides, Sites, Hangouts, etc. 
See The Google Apps for Education Core Services, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/edu/products/productivity-tools (last visited Sept. 12, 2016); 
Google Apps for Education: Common Questions, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/a/answer/139019?hl=en (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). Unlike a 
personal account with Google, Google Apps for Education prohibits advertising, offers 
24/7 support, has enhanced security features, and provides full administration of all 
user accounts. Id. See also Google for Education: Privacy & Security Information Tools 
Schools Can Trust, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/edu/trust/#does-google-own-
school-or-student-data (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (addressing privacy and privacy law 
compliance concerns, including a statement that Google Apps for Education 
contractually requires schools to get the parental consent required by COPPA). 
 8 KHAN ACADEMY, https://www.khanacademy.org/about (last visited Feb. 12, 
2016) (“Khan Academy offers practice exercises, instructional videos, and a 
personalized learning dashboard . . . . [Khan Academy’s] math missions guide learners 
from kindergarten to calculus using state-of-the-art, adaptive technology that identifies 
strengths and learning gaps.”). 
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for teachers and administrators and provide students with 
beneficial interactive learning, the practice of contracting with 
third-party operators raises privacy concerns and creates the 
possibility of substantial harm to the children who use these 
operators’ products.9 
Three substantial risks exist in online classroom 
interactions between young students and third-party operators: 
illegal data collection, susceptibility to criminal activity, and 
identity theft caused by hacking. Firstly and most notably, 
opening the door for operators in the classroom creates the risk 
of illegal data collection and dissemination from both 
advertisers and criminals.10 In order to reach larger audiences, 
advertisers utilize multiple techniques to track a user’s 
behavior and gain insight that will assist in advertisement 
placement on that user’s browser.11 Such techniques include 
tracking activity through a device’s IP address, tracking search 
terms entered into a search engine, and using “cookies” to 
retain a user’s information.12 Tracking a student’s activity in 
such a manner can be particularly dangerous when the 
operator can collect personal information such as name, 
address, or location—when a student either inputs that 
information to create an account for a service or uses a service 
to perform research.13 While such collection by advertisers is a 
 
 9 See Tudor, supra note 3, at 306–30 (2015); Lauren A. Matecki, Update: 
COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for Protecting Youth Privacy Rights in the 
Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 369, 374 (2010); Stephanie Simon, 
Data Mining Your Children, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/data-mining-your-children-106676_Page2.html 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 10 Tudor, supra note 3, at 306–30. Concern has grown in recent years as 
operators increase their use of passive collection methods. Matecki, supra note 9, at 
388. Matecki also quotes that a serious concern for child privacy exists because of “‘the 
vulnerability of children,’ (2) ‘the immediacy and ease with which information can be 
collected from them,’ and (3) ‘the ability of the online medium to circumvent the 
traditional gatekeeping role of the parent.’” Id. at 374 (quoting FTC, FILE NO. 
954,4807, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.shtm). 
 11 Tudor, supra note 3, at 306. 
 12 Id. at 307–10. 
 13 Id. at 311–12 (addressing the ways that applications used in schools collect 
personal information from students and the harms that this creates for the 
unsuspecting student). Collection of personal information may also include a student’s 
daily interests—for example, a math program used in Miami’s iPrep Academy creates 
customized lessons by gathering student interests (ranging from favorite foods to the 
names of their friends) to include in future math problems. PBS NewsHour, supra note 
5, beginning at 1:13. 
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business practice, legislation exists that makes this collection 
illegal when the operator collects personal information from a 
child under the age of thirteen without parental consent.14  
Secondly, the child’s information could be compromised 
through criminal activity.15 Criminal activity could include 
activities such as identity fraud, harassment, and stalking.16 
One recent example includes the 2014 case of United States v. 
Rhim-Grant, in which the defendants (food service managers in 
Miami-Dade County Public Schools) used their access to the 
school computer database to steal approximately four hundred 
student social security numbers, resulting in numerous 
fraudulent tax returns.17 In this particular case, the 
information was stolen by individuals who were part of the 
school’s network; however, as schools contract more frequently 
with third-party online service providers, schools and their 
students become more susceptible to such criminal activity.  
A third major concern is that school databases can be 
hacked, which can lead to identity theft.18 Hackers have 
targeted universities in search of students’ names, birthdates, 
and social security numbers.19 While K–12 school districts have 
not yet had major problems with this type of hacking, young 
students may be more susceptible as they participate in 
classroom educational applications, not only because these 
grades use applications from third-party operators with 
increasing frequency, but also because children lack full 
knowledge of the potential harm they invite by entering their 
 
 14 15 U.S.C. §6502(a) (1998) (prohibiting an operator of a website or online 
service directed to children or knowingly used by children to collect the child’s personal 
information). 
 15 See Tudor, supra note 3, at 325–330. 
 16 Id. at 325. 
 17 PBS NewsHour, supra note 5, beginning at 4:57; Press Release, FBI: Miami 
Division, Twenty-Five Defendants Charged in Separate Schemes That Resulted in 
Thousands of Identities Stolen and Millions of Dollars in Identity Theft Tax Filings 
(April 3, 2014), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/miami/press-releases/2014/twenty-five-
defendants-charged-in-separate-schemes-that-resulted-in-thousands-of-identities-
stolen-and-millions-of-dollars-in-identity-theft-tax-filings. Frank Maderal, Assistant 
United States Attorney assigned to the Rhim-Grant case, stated that all the defendant 
had to do was “login, access the information, print it out.” PBS NewsHour, supra note 
5, beginning at 5:30. 
 18 Tudor, supra note 3, at 327. 
 19 Id. (citing an FTC report on child identity theft). See also Simon, supra note 9 
(citing an incident at the University of Maryland where nearly three hundred thousand 
students, faculty, and staff had their personal information, including social security 
number, stolen). 
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personal information online. 
In order to protect young students from these dangers and 
ensure compliance with COPPA at school, the law must ask 
who is responsible for ensuring that the students’ personal 
information remains safe—the school or the third-party 
operator? Because COPPA does not apply directly to schools as 
entities,20 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued 
guidance in 2015, creating a “school exception.”21 This 
exception allows schools to give permission to third-party 
operators in place of parents, so long as it is given strictly for 
educational purposes.22 However, it also becomes a question of 
whether federal action is adequate or whether state action is 
also required. Federal legislation like COPPA fails to 
adequately protect young students, and its language generates 
confusion about which third-party operators must follow 
regulations for online privacy and who is at risk for sanctions if 
they don’t comply. States lacking protection should therefore 
create their own legislation targeting classroom interactions 
between students and third-party operators to ensure that 
student personal data is kept private and not subject to outside 
collection and dissemination.  
This Comment addresses concerns and tensions between 
COPPA and the school system and proposes a more 
comprehensive solution at the state level. COPPA itself does 
not apply to a school as an entity; but as technology improves 
and infiltrates the classroom, young students will continue to 
need COPPA’s protection. Due to the FTC’s lack of COPPA 
enforcement, some states have begun to create their own 
school-specific legislation to increase protection for their 
students while interacting online. Allowing illegal collection of 
data without proper consent to go virtually unmonitored 
creates a high risk of harm to a child. Therefore, this Comment 
 
 20 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2) (1998) (defining operators as having commercial 
purposes). See also Lesley Fair, Testing: A Review Session on COPPA and Schools, 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2015/01/testing-testing-review-session-coppa-schools 
(“Schools—which are usually part of the local government—don’t fall within the legal 
definition of who’s covered by COPPA because they aren’t commercial ‘operators.’”). 
 21 A Guide for Business And Parents And Small Entity Compliance Guide, 
Federal Trade Commission M1 (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions#Schools 
[hereinafter 2015 Guidance]. 
 22 Id. 
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argues that all states should proactively create legislation 
governing classroom interactions between students and third-
party operators. 
Part II of this Comment examines COPPA’s legislative 
history and its requirements, as well as how lack of 
enforcement has rendered COPPA’s application to schools 
unclear and unworkable. Further, this section compares 
COPPA to current federal student-data legislation and recent 
federal attempts at classroom-oriented agency rules and 
legislation, concluding that reform at the state level is the most 
effective in ensuring that young students’ privacy is not 
compromised through the illegal collection of personal 
information.  
Part III explains and critiques the gap between COPPA’s 
protection and the school system, focusing on the confusing and 
inefficient consent requirements that both schools and third-
party operators can circumvent under FTC regulation as it 
stands. It argues that allowing a school to obtain blanket 
“verifiable parental consent” is dangerous because (a) it is 
difficult for the online operator to authenticate the consent 
given by the school, and (b) it is unclear who specifically within 
the school can give the consent in lieu of parents. Further, 
because states seek greater protection and transparency in 
online dealings for their students, Part III also provides 
examples of states, such as California, Washington, Utah, and 
Delaware, that have begun creating student-data legislation to 
address student and third-party-operator interactions in the 
classroom. It urges that the remaining states do the same—
particularly by adopting a dual prohibitive/governance 
approach (an approach that encompasses both express 
prohibitions and methods of oversight for schools to ensure 
compliance).  
Part IV offers both prohibitive- and governance-based 
provisions states should consider when writing new student-
data legislation. Lastly, Part V concludes. 
II. COPPA: BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS CREATED 
A. Legislative History and Reasons for Enactment 
By 1998 the personal computer had become a basic tool not 
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only at work, but also in the home and at school.23 According to 
the 1997 census, 74.4% of children ages three to seventeen had 
access to a computer, and 22.6% of these children had used the 
Internet.24 With computer and Internet use on the rise among 
some of society’s youngest members, Congress found that 
protecting such students’ personal information became a 
priority. The FTC determined in 1998 that “children lack the 
developmental capacity and judgment to give meaningful 
consent to the release of personal information to a third 
party”25—a child may disclose such information in order to 
engage in online activity without fully understanding the 
consequences.26 “Before 1998, no federal law restricted 
collection of personal information from children online.”27 In 
fact, according to a survey conducted by the FTC that year, 
89% of websites directed at children collected personal 
information from them, with only 23% of websites requesting 
parental consent from parents for this collection.28  
Such collection practices by website operators caused some 
people to be wary of Internet use for children.29 Ninety-seven 
percent of parents expressed concerns about their children’s 
personal information being shared with third parties.30 
Congress found that interactions presented to minors while on 
the Internet “frustrate parental . . . control,” that protection of 
minors on the Internet “is a compelling government interest,” 
and that offering defenses for minors is the “least restrictive 
means” of protecting their privacy on the Internet.31 As a 
result, Congress adopted Senator Richard Bryan’s COPPA bill 
to advance the following goals:  
(1) [T]o enhance parental involvement in a child’s online 
 
 23 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER USE IN THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION 
CHARACTERISTICS 1 (1997), http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-522.pdf (stating 
that “36.6% [of American households] had computers,” which was “up substantially 
from 22.8% in 1993, 15.0% in 1989, and 8.2% in 1984.”). 
 24 Id. at 3. 
 25 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (1998) 
[hereinafter 1998 FTC REPORT]. 
 26 See Matecki, supra note 9, at 374. 
 27 David R. Hostetler & Seiko F. Okada, Children’s Privacy in Virtual K-12 
Education: Virtual Solutions of the Amended Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) Rule, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 167, 176 (2013). 
 28 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 25, at iii. 
 29 Id. at 3. 
 30 Id. at 37. 
 31 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, Part III (1998). 
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activities in order to protect the privacy of children in the 
online environment; (2) to enhance parental involvement to 
help protect the safety of children in online fora such as 
chatrooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in which 
children may make public postings of identifying information; 
(3) to maintain the security of personally identifiable 
information of children collected online; and (4) to protect 
children’s privacy by limiting the collection of personal 
information from children without parental consent. The 
legislation accomplishes these goals in a manner that 
preserves the interactivity of children’s experience on the 
Internet and preserves children’s access to information in this 
rich and valuable medium.32 
Congress enacted COPPA33 to regulate the online collection, 
use, and disclosure of personal information of children under 
the age of thirteen.34  
B. COPPA Standards and Requirements 
In its latest form (FTC rule passed in 2013), COPPA 
protects a range of personal information: name, address, Social 
Security number, photograph, video, and geolocation 
information.35 COPPA applies to two parties: (a) operators of 
commercial websites and online services directed at children 
and (b) operators of general audience websites and online 
services who have actual knowledge that they are collecting 
personal information from children.36 Before an operator may 
undertake such activities, it must provide notice to parents and 
receive verifiable parental consent.37  
However, the statute recognizes that situations exist in 
which less parental consent is necessary; thus it adopts a 
 
 32 144 Cong. Rec. S11657 (Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan). 
 33 The Child Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (1998) 
(effective in 2000). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See 16 C.F.R. §312.2 (2013). 
 36 15 U.S.C. §6502(a)(1). 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A). “Verifiable parental consent” is defined as: 
[A]ny reasonable effort (taking into consideration available technology), including 
a request for authorization for future collection, use, and disclosure described in 
the notice, to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the operator’s 
personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices, and authorizes the 
collection, use, and disclosure, as applicable, of personal information and the 
subsequent use of that information before that information is collected from that 
child. 
15 U.S.C. § 6501(9). 
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“sliding scale”38 when determining requirements for parental 
consent. COPPA does not require verifiable parental consent 
when the online contact is on a “one-time basis,” for the sole 
purpose of providing notice to a parent and receiving consent, 
for protection of the child’s safety, or as required by law.39 For 
example, a third-party operator does not need to provide notice 
or obtain verifiable parental consent when responding to a one-
time email request from a child where the child’s email is 
promptly deleted after issuing a response.40 However, an 
operator must provide notice to parents and an opportunity to 
opt out when allowing a child to subscribe to periodic 
interactions such as email newsletters and must obtain full 
parental consent in situations where children can post or share 
personal information publicly.41 Any personal information that 
has been collected for these one-time interactions may be kept 
only for as long as necessary to fulfill the operator’s purpose.42 
Afterward, the operator must delete the child’s information 
using reasonable measures.43 Because the law allows for 
situations where parental consent is not required, the key to 
ensuring compliance is enforcement.44  
The FTC is the governing body that regulates and enforces 
COPPA.45 It has the full authority to treat violations in the 
same manner as other rules defining unfair and deceptive acts 
or practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act.46 An 
operator who violates COPPA may face civil penalties up to 
 
 38 Matecki, supra note 9, at 377–78; see also 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b); COPPA +1: 
Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, KELLER AND HECKMAN LLP (Sept. 11, 
2014). 
 39 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2). 
 40 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (H)(2); COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For 
Children’s Privacy, supra note 38. 
 41 COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38. 
 42 16 C.F.R. § 312.10. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 188–89. 
 45 15 U.S.C. § 6505(a) (stating that this title is to be enforced by the commission 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act). The FTC must create regulations to ensure 
parents receive proper notice and opportunity to give parental consent; to provide 
parents with the opportunity to review the child’s information and the opportunity to 
prevent further use of the child’s personal information; to limit a website’s collection of 
the child’s personal information; and to establish procedures to protect the 
confidentiality and security of the child’s information. 2 Fed. Trade Comm’n. § 20:15 
(2015); 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (listing the requirements for the regulations to be 
imposed by the FTC). 
 46 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1). 
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$16,000 per violation.47 In determining the amount of civil 
penalties, courts consider the “egregiousness of the violations, 
whether the operator has previously violated the Rule, the 
number of children involved, the amount and type of personal 
information collected, how the information was used, whether 
it was shared with third parties, and the size of the company.”48 
In addition, any state attorney general may bring a civil action 
on behalf of its residents.49  
However, even with such measures established by law, the 
FTC has not effectively enforced them.50 As of January 1, 2015, 
only twenty-four COPPA actions had been filed.51 In addition, 
only three states—New Jersey, Texas, and Maryland—had 
successfully brought enforcement actions.52  
C. Problems with COPPA Enforcement 
Since its enactment, COPPA has faced criticism for both its 
ineffectiveness and its improper enforcement.53 Even though 
COPPA initially seemed to work after its first FTC review in 
2002, with more than 90% of children’s websites meeting the 
necessary disclosure requirement, it has not generated 
resounding success with websites not specifically directed at 
children under the age of thirteen.54 The statute’s vague 
language has rendered it difficult for website operators to avoid 
violations.55 One of the main criticisms directed at COPPA 
involves the ability of a child to falsify his or her age, tricking 
the operator into believing it is in compliance with COPPA 
 
 47 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (B)(2). 
 48 Id. 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1). 
 50 See COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38; 
Matecki, supra note 9. 
 51 Richard A. Chapo, List of COPPA FTC Enforcement Cases, COPPA AND 
FERPA: COPPA AND FERPA LEGAL ADVICE (Feb. 3, 2015). 
 52 Id.; see also Maryland Attorney General, Attorney General Gansler Secures 
Settlement from Snapchat, Inc. (June 12, 2014); New Jersey Attorney General, New 
Jersey Attorney General and Division of Consumer Affairs File Federal Suit Against 
App Developer Accused of Collecting, Transmitting Children’s Personal Information 
Without Parental Notification or Consent (June 6, 2012); Texas Attorney General, 
Attorney General Abbott Takes Action Against Web Sites That Illegally Collect Personal 
Information from Minors (Dec. 5, 2007). 
 53 See Matecki, supra note 9, at 379–87; Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 
181–84. 
 54 FTC, STAFF REPORT, Protecting Children’s Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey 
On Compliance (Apr. 1st, 2002), www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/coppasurvey.pdf. 
 55 Matecki, supra note 9, at 379. 
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when in fact it is in violation and thus subject to fine.56 Only 
fourteen federal actions were filed from 1999 to 2014, including 
actions against Lisa Frank, Inc. (2001); Hershey Food Corp. 
(2003); Xanga.com, Inc. (2006); Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment (2008); and Yelp, Inc. (2014).57 With technology 
and online interaction capabilities continually on the rise, 
especially in the classroom, the likelihood of further COPPA 
violations is inevitable. 
D. Application of COPPA in Schools and the “School 
Exception” 
One of COPPA’s perceived shortcomings is its 
inapplicability to schools. While COPPA protection applies to 
the privacy of children under the age of thirteen, it does not 
directly apply to schools as entities.58 Thus, a gap exists 
between the protection of a child’s privacy at home and a child’s 
privacy while at school.   
Unlike other federal legislation, COPPA deals strictly with 
interactions between children under thirteen and online 
operators. Its purpose is to protect children regardless of the 
setting. In application, COPPA requires that before a third-
party operator authorizes a child under thirteen to use its 
website and services, it must provide notice and obtain 
verifiable parental consent.59 However, operators contracted 
within the school setting must provide such notice directly to 
the school, not to the parent.60 Additionally, but only upon 
request from the school, the operator must provide a 
description of the types of information collected, an opportunity 
to prevent further use or collection of the child’s personal 
information, and the opportunity to review the child’s personal 
information submitted and/or have it deleted.61 Thus, notice 
provided to schools allows the schools to decide whether to 
 
 56 Id. at 382–83. COPPA requires that an operator have “actual knowledge” that 
it is collecting personal information from a child in order to be in violation. 15 U.S.C. § 
6502(a)(1). 
 57 Chapo, supra note 51. 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2). 
 59 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A). 
 60 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(1) (stating that the operator must 
provide the school with all the notices required under COPPA). However, the FTC also 
recommends that the schools consider making the notice available to parents as best 
practice. Id. 
 61 Id. 
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contract with each specific operator for educational services.  
The FTC draws a distinction for when an operator may rely 
on the school’s consent in lieu of parental consent. If the 
operator collects the child’s data solely for the use and benefit of 
the school, consent given by the school is sufficient.62 This 
school exception is based on the policy rationale that “school 
officials already act on behalf of the students’ best interests 
and well-being when arranging and delivering their education 
in non-virtual context.”63 However, if the operator collects and 
uses the child’s information for commercial purposes, then 
parental consent must be obtained.64 The FTC states, “[a]s long 
as the operator limits use of the child’s information to the 
educational context authorized by the school, the operator can 
presume that the school’s authorization is based on the school’s 
having obtained the parent’s consent.”65 It further advises, 
“Where an operator gets consent from the school rather than 
the parent, the operator’s method must be reasonably 
calculated, in light of available technology, to ensure that a 
school is actually providing consent, and not a child pretending 
to be a teacher, for example.”66 While other federal protections 
do exist to protect a student’s data at school, they do not offer 
the same protections as COPPA, leaving children under the age 
of thirteen vulnerable while engaging with third-party 
operators at school. 
1. The inadequacy of current federal student data legislation 
The most widely known federal student data privacy law is 
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).67 
FERPA covers elementary, secondary, and post-secondary 
school students.68 However, FERPA is narrow—limited to the 
 
 62 Id. at (M)(2) (“Where a school has contracted with an operator to collect 
personal information from students for the use and benefit of the school, and for no 
other commercial purpose, the operator is not required to obtain consent directly from 
parents . . . .”). 
 63 Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 198. 
 64 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(2). For the collection of a child’s 
information for commercial purposes, some methods of obtaining “verifiable parental 
consent” include signed consent forms sent via mail, fax, or scan; credit/debit card 
transactions; toll-free phone calls; and checking the parent’s government-issued 
identification against a database of such information. Id. at (H)(4). 
 65 Id. at (M)(1). 
 66 Id. at (M)(2). 
 67 20 U.S.C. § 1232. 
 68 20 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(3) (2013). 
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prohibition of the release of students’ personal information 
from a school’s educational records.69 Like COPPA, FERPA 
creates scenarios in which parental consent may be 
circumvented.70 Since FERPA strictly governs educational 
records, it does not extend to the online classroom interactions 
that have become so prevalent in today’s society.  
Another federal statute that addresses online privacy is the 
Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment of 1978 (PPRA),71 which 
protects students in grades K–12.72 Like COPPA, PPRA applies 
when personal information is collected through online 
interaction, and even provides a similar “school official 
exception.”73 PPRA allows the third-party operator to use the 
student’s personal information commercially, so long as the 
proper parental consent has been obtained.74 Because PPRA 
carries the same consent exceptions as COPPA, it has the same 
inherent flaw—failure to provide the necessary checks to 
ensure parental consent for children, especially since the 
statute gives schools the ability to circumvent parental consent 
for educational purposes. Neither FERPA nor PPRA is 
adequate nor strict enough to address the current parental 
consent gap between schools, parents, and third-party 
providers to ensure a child’s protection. Therefore, change must 
be made at the state level. 
 
 69 Id. at (b)(1). An “educational record” includes “records, files, documents, and 
other materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are 
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such 
agency or institution.” Id. at (a)(4). Under FERPA, parents retain the right to review 
and amend their child’s education records until the child reaches eighteen years old or 
reaches a post-secondary institution. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d). FERPA requires parental 
consent be given before any personal information or information found within the 
educational record is shared. Id. at (b)(1). 
 70 Under the “school official exception,” the school may disclose information 
without prior consent to other school officials or vendors who perform a function for the 
school that would otherwise be performed by a school employee. 34 C.F.R. § 
99.31(a)(1)(i)(A)–(B) (2011). The vendor must have a legitimate educational interest in 
the data, and the school must be in direct control of the vendor’s use and maintenance 
of the data. Id. at (a)(1)(ii). 
 71 20 U.S.C. § 1232(h). 
 72 20 U.S.C. § 1232h(c)(6)(F) (2012). 
 73 The exception allows the school to circumvent parental consent when the 
personal information collection is for the “exclusive purpose of developing, evaluating, 
or providing educational products or services . . . .” Id. at (c)(4)(A). 
 74 PPRA requires that schools notify parents, obtain consent, and offer an opt-
out opportunity before allowing the child to engage in any online “collection, disclosure, 
or use of personal information collected from students for the purpose of marketing or 
for selling that information.” Id. at (c)(2) and (c)(1)(E) (2012). 
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2. Recent COPPA concerns and changes: The 2013 FTC rule 
and federal legislative attempts 
In the fifteen years COPPA has been in effect, it has faced 
numerous reform attempts at the federal level via legislation 
and agency action. In 2013 the FTC successfully promulgated a 
rule that provides children with greater privacy as well as 
clearer guidelines for third parties obtaining parental 
consent.75 While the FTC’s new changes do expand a child’s 
privacy and provide the parent with more control, they do so in 
a manner that does not improve its application in schools. This 
is especially concerning as technology continues to infiltrate 
every aspect of life and the lines of COPPA compliance become 
blurred.  
As a result, legislators in Congress have taken steps toward 
expanding COPPA to the classroom.76 Generally, recent 
legislative attempts have focused on expanding the age group 
to cover a larger group of minors, expanding the definition of 
“personal information,” and expanding the group of 
 
 75 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2013). A child’s “personal information” includes additional 
persistent identifiers, such as IP address; photo, audio, or video of the child; and 
geolocation. Id. at § 312.2; see also COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s 
Privacy, supra note 38. Additionally, the FTC addresses specific ways for operators to 
obtain verifiable parental consent, including the new methods of approval by checking 
a government-issued ID against a database, video conferences with parents, and asking 
knowledge-based questions to which only a parent would have the answer. 16 C.F.R. § 
312.5(b); see also COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38. 
These explicitly-stated methods will hopefully direct operators toward a “reasonably 
calculated” method and make the process more tangible and efficient. 16 C.F.R. § 
312.5; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(9) (defining “verifiable parental consent” as “any 
reasonable effort . . . to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the operator’s 
personal collection, use, and disclosure practices, and authorizes [such uses].”). The 
FTC also reigned in their “notice to parents” standard, requiring many additional 
administrative and operational compliance steps to ensure correct notice is provided. 
16 C.F.R. §312.4. Notice given to parents “must be clearly and understandably written, 
complete, and must contain no unrelated, confusing, or contradictory materials.” Id. at 
§ 312.4(b). Such compliance steps include both direct notice to parents (i.e., through the 
use of hyperlinks) and notice given through the website or online service (i.e., third 
party operators “must post a prominent and clearly labeled link to an online notice of 
its information practices . . . .”). Id. at §312.4(c)–(d). 
 76 Congress considers student privacy to be an important issue to many of its 
constituents, evidenced by its hundreds of attempts to pass legislation over the years. 
See Tanya Roscorla, The Lowdown on Federal Student Data Privacy Legislation of 
2015, CENTER FOR DIGITAL EDUCATION (July 28, 2015), [hereinafter Lowdown on 
Federal Legislation 2015], http://www.centerdigitaled.com/k-12/The-Lowdown-on-
Federal-Student-Data-Privacy-Legislation-of-2015.html (“Over the last few years, state 
legislatures have considered hundreds of student data privacy bills, and that’s shown 
federal policymakers that this issue is important to their constituents.”). 
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“operators.”77 Some of the most recent legislative attempts 
include the Do Not Track Kids Act of 2015,78 the Student 
Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act of 2015,79 and the 
Every Student Succeeds Act.80 The Do Not Track Kids Act of 
2015 would expand COPPA coverage to minors between the 
ages of twelve and sixteen81 and make it unlawful for operators 
(including operators of websites, online services, and mobile 
applications explicitly) to engage in targeted marketing 
without verifiable parental consent for children or the consent 
of the minor.82 It would also provide an “eraser button” for 
 
 77 See Comparison of 2015 Federal Education Data Privacy Bills, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.nasbe.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-Federal-Education-Data-Privacy-Bills-
Comparison-2015.07.22-Public.pdf, [hereinafter Federal Legislation Chart] (comparing 
eight different pieces of legislation introduced or passed in 2015 to FERPA and 
COPPA, which demonstrates that protecting education privacy is a relevant and 
important issue to Congress). 
 78 H.R. 2734, 114th Cong. (2015). The Do Not Track Kids Act of 2015 is most 
pertinent to the collection of personal information from young children by third party 
contractors in school. It was introduced by Senator Edward Markey and 
Representative Joe Barton to the House on June 11, 2015, and seeks to amend COPPA 
and expand its coverage. See Summary H.R. 2734, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2734; Ronald London, John D. 
Seiver & Bryan Thompson, Significant Amendments to COPPA Proposed in Do Not 
Track Kids Act, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.privsecblog.com/2015/06/articles/marketing-and-consumer-
privacy/significant-amendments-to-coppa-proposed-in-do-not-track-kids-act/. Earlier 
versions of this legislation were proposed in 2011 and 2013, but both died in committee. 
See H.R. 3481 (113th): Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3481; Summary H.R. 1895, 112th 
Congress (2011–2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1895. 
 79 H.R. 2092, 114th Cong. (2015). Representatives Luke Messer and Jared Polis 
introduced The Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act on April 29, 2015. Id. 
See also Press Release, Congressman Jared Polis, Messer, Polis Introduce Landmark 
Bill to Protect Student Data Privacy: Measure Represents the Most Significant Federal 
Attempt to Protect Student Data in Decades (Apr. 29, 2015), 
http://polis.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397810. The Act focuses 
on regulating the online providers in the K–12 classrooms, not on amending COPPA. 
See Federal Legislation Chart, supra note 77, at “The Student Digital Privacy and 
Parental Rights Act of 2015” column. The Act prohibits operators from collecting and 
selling a student’s information to a third party for a non-school related purpose. H.R. 
2092, at §3(a). 
 80 Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (enacted Dec. 10, 
2015). 
 81 H.R. 2734, at § 9(a)(1) (defining “minor” as “an individual over the age of 12 
and under the age of 16). This amendment distinguishes between a “child” and a 
“minor,” with a “child” being an individual under the age of 13, as defined by the 
parent statute COPPA (15 U.S.C. § 6501(1)). 
 82 H.R. 2734, at § 3(a) (stating that a parent must give verifiable parental 
consent before an operator may collect a child’s personal information, and a minor 
must give consent before the operator may collect the minor’s personal information). 
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parents and children to eliminate personal information that 
has been made available,83 and set forth enforcement 
provisions for other agencies and states in addition to those 
promulgated by the FTC.84 The Student Digital Privacy and 
Parental Rights Act would prohibit operators from collecting 
and selling a student’s information to a third party for a non-
school related purpose85 and give parents more control over 
their child’s information.86 Most notably, this legislation would 
require operators to publicly list what type of data they collect, 
how it is used, and whether it is shared in a clear and easy-to-
understand manner.87 While these two attempts seem 
promising, their track records and stagnant positions in 
Congress seem to suggest that federal legislation may not be 
the most efficient or welcome approach to protecting our 
children from the threat of private-information collection and 
use by third-party operators in the classroom.88 
Congress successfully enacted a student-data privacy law in 
2015, The Every Student Succeeds Act,89 but eliminated the 
 
 83 Id. at § 6(b)(1) (stating that no later than one year after the enactment of the 
Act, the commission must promulgate a rule “to implement mechanisms that permit a 
user . . . to erase or otherwise eliminate content or information submitted . . . that is 
publicly available . . . and contains or displays personal information of children or 
minors.”). Additionally, the operator must make users aware of the mechanism. Id. 
 84 Id. at § 7(b)–(c) (listing five other federal acts under which this Act may be 
enforced and explaining the steps a state attorney general must take to enforce). 
 85 H.R. 2092, at §3(a). 
 86 Id. at § 3(c)(1) (stating that parents have the ability to directly authorize the 
student’s information for non-educational purposes). Also, parents may request the 
deletion of their child’s information that is not required by the school to be maintained. 
Id. at § 3(b)(2). 
 87 Id. at § 3(b)(3). 
 88 The Do Not Track Kids Act of 2015 has not moved since its introduction and 
assignment to committee. See Summary H.R. 2734, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2734 (showing that the last 
action took place on June 12, 2015). Additionally, the failed attempts in 2011 and 2013 
provide little hope for this amendment’s enactment. See H.R. 3481 (113th): Do Not 
Track Kids Act of 2013, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3481; Summary 
H.R. 1895, 112th Congress (2011–2012), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-
congress/house-
bill/1895?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hr1895%5C%22%22%5D%7D&re
sultIndex=3. The Student Digital Privacy and Parental Rights Act of 2015 has also not 
moved since being assigned to committee on May 1, 2015. See Summary: H.R. 2092, 




 89 Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 (enacted Dec. 10, 
2015). The Act was enacted on December 10, 2015 to amend the Elementary and 
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language directed at protecting interactions between students 
and third-party operators.90 The bill originally seemed 
promising in bringing improvements to student privacy at the 
federal level through the creation of an enforcement 
committee.91 Such a committee would have been the first major 
step in enforcing the protections that laws like COPPA have let 
slip through the cracks—such as ensuring proper parental 
consent has been obtained. Because these extra classroom 
privacy protections failed to make it into the final version of 
the law, it seems that Congress is unwilling to address this 
issue anytime soon. Failing to realize that technology will not 
wait for the law to catch up will bring more harm and privacy 
violations to those who deserve the most protection. Therefore, 
in an effort to keep up with the technological advancements 
and ensure a safer school environment, states should create 
legislation specifically directed to online student interaction at 
school.  
III. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND COPPA 
The applicability of COPPA to the school setting has been 
unclear since its inception. Although the FTC seemed to 
 
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 6311. Id. 
 90 See Benjamin Herold, Student Data Privacy Mostly Missing in ESEA 
Reauthorization, EDUCATION WEEK (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:23 PM). In its enacted form, the 
Every Student Succeeds Act focuses more on a school’s accountability in ensuring 
academic achievement. See Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 
(2015); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: A 
PROGRESS REPORT ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (Dec. 2015). The 
Every Student Succeeds Act does the following: ensures that states set high standards, 
maintains accountability, empowers states and local decision-makers to develop their 
own educational improvement systems, preserves annual assessments and reduces the 
burden of erroneous and ineffective testing, provides more children access to high-
quality preschool, and establishes new resources to test teaching strategies and their 
success. Id. at 1–2. Congress only addresses student privacy vaguely within the text, 
with broad findings such as, “Students’ personally identifiable information is important 
to protect;” “Students’ information should not be shared with individuals other than 
school officials in charge of educating those students without clear notice to parents;” 
and “With the use of more technology, and more research about student learning, the 
responsibility to protect students’ personally identifiable information is more important 
than ever.” Every Student Succeeds Act, at §§ 8545(a)(1)–(3). 
 91 See Lowdown on Federal Legislation 2015, supra note 76. Originally, the 
legislation was to include the creation of a Student Privacy Committee for enforcement 
and for clarifying unclear definitions, such as “third party” and “personal identifiable 
information.” Federal Legislation Chart, supra note 77, at “ESEA Amendment” column. 
The committee was to ensure that identifiable data could not be used for targeted 
advertising or marketing and that a student’s data could be deleted upon request. Id. 
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recognize the need for COPPA protection within schools, it 
stated in its response to notice and comment and within its 
Statement of Basis and Purpose that since “many schools 
already seek parental consent for in-school Internet access . . . 
the operator can presume that the school’s authorization is 
based on the school’s having obtained the parent’s consent.”92 
This creates an extra barrier for third-party operators in 
gaining verifiable parental consent, and further begs the 
question of whether the contractor must “double-check” the 
school’s consent policies. Such a burden creates the uncertainty 
of consistent COPPA enforcement. The burden should not be on 
the operators alone—schools should have some of the 
responsibility of ensuring the protection of their students’ 
privacy rights. With technology more prevalent than ever in 
the classroom, measures should be taken to ensure both 
protection of our most vulnerable citizens while in school and 
protection of a parent’s right to give consent.  
A. The FTC’s Unsettling Guidance to Schools: The Problem 
with Allowing Schools to Give “Verifiable Parental 
Consent” 
In March 2015 the FTC released FAQs that specifically 
address how schools can seek compliance with COPPA. Schools 
must confirm that the services they use comply with federal 
law, including COPPA for schools that teach children under 
thirteen.93 Under COPPA, the FTC said that schools may act as 
a parent’s agent in giving consent when the services are solely 
for an educational purpose to benefit the school,94 and that the 
operators of the educational online services may presume that 
the school has reasonably obtained proper parental consent so 
long as the student’s personal information is not used for 
commercial purposes.95 While such guidance could be 
considered reasonable, presuming that a school always 
provides notice to parents and gains verifiable parental consent 
before contracting with a new third party is unrealistic.  
This is the main flaw with the FTC’s compliance guidance 
for schools. Not only does it take control out of the hands of the 
 
 92 64 Fed. Reg. 59888, 59903 (Nov. 3, 1999). 
 93 Mutkoski, supra note 2, at 519. 
 94 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(1). 
 95 Id. at (M)(2). 
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parents, but it also places an extra burden on third party 
contractors. The contractors must ensure that the consent 
methods used by schools are “reasonably calculated” when 
relying on the school as a proxy for parental consent.96 This 
seems to take away responsibility from schools in protecting 
the privacy of their students under the age of thirteen. Without 
responsibility on the schools to uphold COPPA, collecting a 
young child’s data while at school becomes easier, especially 
when there is no careful oversight or parental involvement 
required. Therefore, allowing schools to give “verifiable 
parental consent” opens the door for many possible COPPA 
violations. 
Allowing a school to provide “verifiable parental consent” to 
an online operator on behalf of a parent seems to be the most 
efficient and least burdensome method to educate students in 
the technological era. Having to inform every single parent of a 
child under thirteen of all the collection and privacy disclosures 
of every single application or website the child uses could waste 
a great amount of time, energy, and resources. In addition, it is 
likely that some parents will deny their child’s involvement, 
arguably placing the child at an educational disadvantage. 
Advocates for schools acting in loco parentis—”in the place of a 
parent”—believe that “[requiring] one more administrative step 
. . . saddles already overburdened educators and schools with 
one more level of effort and is likely to further hinder the 
delivery of effective online education.”97 However, exposing 
young children’s personal information and surrendering their 
parents’ ability to protect them can produce an even greater 
harm.98 A desire for efficiency and a virtual classroom does not 
outweigh the privacy rights of society’s youngest members and 
the parental right of control.99 
 
 96 Id. However, if the operator intends to use the student’s data for other 
commercial purposes, the operator must obtain actual parental consent. Id. 
 97 Hostetler & Okada, supra note 27, at 199. 
 98 See supra Part I. 
 99 According to a survey conducted from March 26, 2015 through April 2, 2015, 
while the majority of parents are comfortable if their child’s data is collected solely for 
the purpose of educational benefit, they generally disagree with the use of their child’s 
personal data for commercial purposes. Beyond the Fear Factor, supra note 2, at 8. 
Appropriate educational purposes that parents believe are okay to collect include 
grades, attendance records, special needs status, standardized test scores, and 
disciplinary records. Id. Most parents are comfortable with the child’s principal, 
teachers, and schools using the information. Id. at 8–9 (showing that 89% of parents 
are comfortable with their child’s principal and teachers having access to their child’s 
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There are two major problems with a school giving 
“verifiable parental consent” on behalf of the child’s parents. 
First, it is difficult for the online operator to authenticate the 
consent given by the school.100 Under COPPA, an online 
operator must make sure that the school offering the parental 
consent has used “reasonably calculated” methods to obtain 
consent.101 The operator must ensure that the school is 
providing authentic consent, not falsified consent such as a 
child pretending to be a teacher.102 The second problem is 
determining which school officials may provide the consent.103 
The FTC recommends that the school district or individual 
school be responsible for making the decision to use the 
operator’s services and forming the contract.104 However, in 
many cases it is the individual teachers who make such 
decisions.105 From technological and legal standpoints, this may 
not always be the best method.106  
Without proper training and understanding, both school 
districts and teachers may lack the expertise and knowledge of 
the law required to make a completely informed decision, and 
may enter into contracts with operators that are in violation of 
COPPA.107 These decision makers may not know of the 
required privacy and collection disclosures that operators must 
provide, and may in turn fail to discover the operator’s true 
collection purposes or fail to get additional parental consent if 
so required.108 This is especially the case with free applications 
 
information). However, most parents are not comfortable with companies that create 
educational software, websites, and applications having access to their child’s data. Id. 
(providing the statistic that only 42% of parents feel comfortable with companies that 
create educational software, websites, and apps having access to their child’s 
information). 
 100 Kelsey Finch, COPPA in the Classroom, THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (May 7, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/coppa-in-the-
classroom/. 
 101 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(2). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Finch, supra note 100. 
 104 2015 Guidance, supra note 21, at (M)(3). 
 105 See Finch, supra note 100. 
 106 A recent survey conducted among 4,300 teachers found that 49% of teachers 
believed that parents should have the smallest role in deciding what technology to use 
in the classroom. Dian Schaffhauser, Teachers: We Want More Control over Ed Tech 
Decisions, THE JOURNAL (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://thejournal.com/articles/2015/12/16/teachers-we-want-more-control-over-ed-tech-
decisions.aspx. 
 107 See Finch, supra note 100; PBS NewsHour, supra note 5, beginning at 3:47. 
 108 A Fordham Law study published in 2013 found that “as a governance matter, 
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since they are funded mostly through targeted marketing and 
the collection of the user’s information.109 Additionally, the 
operators’ presumption of “verifiable parental consent” when 
contracting for educational purposes requires that they either 
simply trust that the school acted accordingly with COPPA or 
investigate the school’s methods, which seems highly 
inconvenient and unlikely to occur.  
If the school does indeed fail to comply with COPPA, it is 
not the school that is most harmed or punished. It is the 
children and parents who face harm to their rights, and the 
operators that risk federal fines and punishment. Schools lack 
any incentive to ensure compliance with COPPA. Without 
uniform procedures laid out for schools to ensure enforcement, 
the guessing game of whether actual “verifiable parental 
consent” has been obtained will continue, as will the loss of 
privacy rights for society’s most vulnerable members. With 
failure on the federal level to ensure that “verifiable parental 
consent” has been obtained, the best way to achieve a uniform 
system of enforcement is through state law. 
B. Examples of How States Are Responding 
Since COPPA’s application to the school setting is still 
unclear and fails to be adequately addressed at the federal 
level, many states have begun enacting their own legislation to 
fix the gaps between child privacy, parental consent, third-
party operators, and the classroom. Because COPPA has a 
state law preemption clause110 that prevents the states from 
rewriting their own versions of COPPA, legislators are tasked 
 
approximately 20% of the responding districts had no policies addressing teacher use of 
information resources.” Joel Reidenberg et al., Privacy and Cloud Computing in Public 
Schools, FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL CENTER ON LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY, 24 (Dec. 
13, 2013), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=clip 
(finding that 95% of districts rely on cloud services for a variety of functions). In such 
cases, the school administration has no oversight of the transfer of student 
information. Id. The study provides the following example: “[I]f a school principal or 
teacher decided to use a service such as Dropbox for students to share family photos, 
the central administration would not have the opportunity to vet the terms and 
conditions of the service and would not have the ability to ensure COPPA compliance.” 
Id. 
 109 Tudor, supra note 3, at 311. 
 110 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) (1998) (stating that “No State or local government may 
impose any liability for commercial activities or actions by operators . . . in commerce 
in connection with an activity or action described in this title that is inconsistent with 
the treatment of those activities or actions under this section.”). 
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with creating very narrow, school-specific, privacy legislation to 
ensure that there is no conflict with the COPPA scheme.111 
Some common approaches to state legislation include creating 
unambiguous, school-specific language, increasing the level of 
transparency between the third-party contractor and the 
parent, and forming privacy task enforcement committees or 
appointing officers to oversee compliance. 
1. Unambiguous school-specific legislation 
The most successful and strict piece of privacy legislation, 
the Student Online Personal Information Protection Act 
(SOPIPA),112 comes from California and has served as a model 
for many other states.113 It focuses specifically on the 
interactions of K–12 schools and online operators114 and 
eliminates confusion over parental consent by providing 
specific, all-inclusive prohibitions.115 Unlike federal legislation, 
SOPIPA does not allow an operator to use the students’ 
information for any commercial purpose, so a convoluted 
parental consent provision is not necessary.116 SOPIPA 
prohibits targeted marketing, the creation of student profiles 
for commercial purposes, and the sale of a student’s 
information.117 It also requires that an operator “implement 
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices” 
and “delete a student’s covered information if the school or 
district requests deletion of data under the control of the school 
or district.”118 California’s new law is the first of its kind and 
has inspired other strict state legislation protecting the privacy 
rights of young students, especially in states like Washington, 
Utah, and Delaware.119  
 
 111 See COPPA +1: Issues and Impacts For Children’s Privacy, supra note 38. 
 112 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (2014). 
 113 See Tanya Roscorla, More States Pass Laws to Protect Student Data, CENTER 
FOR DIGITAL EDUCATION (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.centerdigitaled.com/k-12/What-
States-Did-with-Student-Data-Privacy-Legislation-in-2015.html?utm_source=related. 
 114 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(a). 
 115 See id., at (b). 
 116 See Id. 
 117 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (b)(1)–(3). 
 118 Id. at (d). 
 119 See Roscorla, supra note 113. 
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2. Increased transparency between third-party operators and 
parents 
Washington’s most recent student privacy law, The Student 
User Privacy in Education Rights Act (SUPER Act),120 
promotes a greater amount of transparency between the online 
service providers and the schools. Specifically, the law requires 
that the operators provide a clear and easy-to-understand 
explanation about the types of information they collect, give 
notice before making material changes to their privacy policies 
for school services, and facilitate access to and correction of a 
student’s personal information if so requested by the student, 
parent, school, or teacher.121 Like COPPA, the SUPER Act only 
allows the school to give consent on behalf of the parent for 
educational purposes.122 Similar to SOPIPA, this law only 
applies to student-oriented services, not to services that are 
designed and marketed for individuals or entities generally.123 
While the language found in COPPA creates confusion with 
regard to “verifiable parental consent” and carries unclear 
application to the school setting, the SUPER Act provides 
specific school scenario-based guidance, leaving little room for 
inconsistent application by the school and misunderstandings 
of consent and notice responsibilities.124 With more 
transparency and little room left for interpretation, a law like 
this would likely be much easier to enforce. Having such 
thorough requirements for transparency should be necessary to 
ensure that all parties involved—schools, third-party operators, 
parents, and even students—are aware of their responsibilities 
and protections in such a new, emerging classroom interaction.  
3. Privacy task enforcement officers/committees  
Other states, like Utah, have taken a slightly different, 
 
 120 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.604.010–.903 (2015). 
 121 Id. at § 28A.604.020(1)–(3). 
 122 Id. at § 28A.604.030(1). Parents retain full control when the operator desires 
to use the student’s personal information for commercial purposes. Id. 
 123 Id. at § 28A.604.010 (1)(a); see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584(a) (2014). 
 124 For example, Section 3 discusses the “Obligations of School Service 
Providers—Transparency,” Section 4 discusses “Obligations of School Service 
Providers—Choice and Control,” and Section 5 discusses “Obligations of School Service 
Providers—Safeguards.” S.B. 5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3–5. In addition, Section 6 
discusses how the prohibitions apply to adaptive learning and customized education. 
Id. at § 6. 
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more enforcement-based approach.125 Until it was recently 
repealed in May 2016, Utah’s law explicitly designated the 
considerations of maintaining, securing, and safeguarding 
student data to the state board of education. The state board of 
education also provided disclosures to parents and students on 
how the students’ data would be collected and used and 
managed contracts with third-party service providers.126 This 
scheme filled the inconsistent enforcement gap created by 
COPPA and lessened the uncertainty of who is responsible for 
ensuring the child’s privacy security while at school. 
Additionally, the law created a “chief privacy officer,” who was 
required to “oversee the administration of student privacy 
laws” and “work with the board to develop funding proposals 
and recommendations . . . .”127 Designating such enforcement 
responsibilities to an entity whose sole job is privacy oversight 
is likely the best method of improving the level of enforcement 
and guaranteeing that a student’s personal information is not 
collected and used inappropriately. In order to avoid the loss of 
a child’s privacy rights due to lack of clear administrative 
guidance, such privacy officers should be appointed on a wider 
scale.  
C. How States Should Respond: Prohibitive and 
Governance Approaches 
Even though statues like California’s SOPIPA, 
Washington’s SUPER Act, and Utah’s “chief privacy officer” 
law are being enacted, not all fifty states have adopted such 
student-data privacy legislation to govern online interactions in 
the classroom.128 Since 2013, safeguarding student privacy has 
emerged as top priority in nearly every state’s legislative 
 
 125 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-711 (2015) (repealed by Laws 2016, c. 221, § 18, eff. 
May 10, 2016 (H.B. 358), http://le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/static/HB0358.html). To access 
the language of the repealed statute, see UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, 
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title53A/Chapter1/C53A-1-S711_2015051220150512.pdf. 
 126 UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE , UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-1-711(2)–(3) (2015), 
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title53A/Chapter1/C53A-1-S711_2015051220150512.pdf. 
 127 Id. at § (4)(b). 
 128 Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in 2015, and What is 
Next?, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN, 1 (Sept. 2015), 
http://2pido73em67o3eytaq1cp8au.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/DQC-Student-Data-Laws-2015-Sept23.pdf, (stating that 
twenty-one states passed student-data privacy laws in 2014 and fifteen states passed 
student-data privacy laws in 2015). 
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agenda.129 However, legislative proposals have differed greatly 
among the states—particularly between prohibitive approaches 
and governance approaches.130 A prohibitive approach “seeks to 
ensure student privacy by preventing or halting the collection 
of a certain type of data . . . or a certain data use . . . .”131 A 
governance approach “seeks to amend or establish the 
procedures (e.g., security audits, public lists of data collected), 
roles and responsibilities (e.g., establishment of a chief privacy 
officer, description of school board and legislature roles), and 
supports (e.g., state leadership) needed to ensure that data are 
used appropriately.”132 While each approach has proven to be 
successful on its own, there is a higher chance (based on 2015 
data) that a combined approach is more successful at reaching 
enactment.133 One piece of legislation that seems to have 
successfully combined these approaches is Delaware’s Student 
Data Privacy Protection Act.134 For example, under the 
prohibitive approach, the Act prohibits online service providers 
that offer services for K–12 from selling student data, using 
student data for target advertising, amassing a profile for non-
educational purposes, and disclosing student data in a manner 
not permitted by the Act.135 Under its governance approach, the 
Act creates a “Student Data Privacy Task Force,” similar to 
Utah’s, with an extremely detailed composition of members.136 
 
 129 Id. at 2. Common questions among legislators in 2015 included the following: 
(a) how can schools use education technology, applications, and websites in 
support of student learning while still safeguarding student privacy?; (b) how can 
states best address the differences in the users and uses of data collected by the 
district and data collected through the use of online services?; (c) how can states 
best implement privacy laws and support their districts’ privacy policies and 
activities?; and (d) how can states best develop privacy and data use policies that 
address immediate questions and concerns and allow for responsive governance 
decisions in the future? 
Id. 
 130 Id. at 3 (stating that 125/182 proposed bills in 2015 were prohibitive in nature 
(with 79/110 in 2014) and that 122/182 proposed bills in 2015 were governance based in 
nature (with 52/110 in 2014)). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 8 (showing that in 2015, while 15/125 prohibitive approach proposals 
were signed into law and 24/122 governance approach proposals were signed into law, 
11/73 proposals that combined the prohibitive and governance approaches became law). 
 134 Student Data Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Del. 2015) (amending 14 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8101A–8106A). With this law, the 
legislature sought to balance a student’s educational opportunities without 
compromising the privacy and security of the student’s information. Id. at “Synopsis.” 
 135 Id. at § 1 (amending 14 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8105A(1)–(4)). 
 136 Id. at § 3. The statute states: 
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Like California, Delaware adopted legislation that creates all-
inclusive prohibitions, thereby removing the confusion created 
by a commercial collection parental consent requirement. 
States that lack sufficient student data privacy laws should 
follow the combined approach taken by Delaware to ensure 
both that harmful actions by third-party operators are 
prohibited and that efficient measures are in place at schools to 
monitor compliance. 
For example, one such state that is in need of adequate 
student-data privacy laws is Tennessee.137 The current law in 
Tennessee, enacted in 2014, only expands protection for 
information within a school educational record, failing to 
address the classroom interactions between schools and third-
party operators.138 Failure to have a uniform law across the 
state leads to a patchwork of inconsistent district policies, 
which in turn leads to different protections for students based 
on district. For example, the Williamson County School District 
implemented the BYOT initiative, or “Bring Your Own 
Technology” initiative during the 2012–2013 school year.139 
 
The Task Force is composed of the Attorney General, the Secretary of Education, 
the President of the State Board of Education, the Secretary of the Department of 
Technology and Information, the Chief of the State School Officers Association, the 
President of the Delaware School Boards Association, the President of the 
Delaware Charter Schools Network, the President of the Delaware State 
Education Association, and the President of the Delaware Congress of Parents & 
Teachers, Inc., or their respective designees, and two representatives from 
companies, trade associations, or groups which operate in the area of student data 
privacy or online educational technology services, appointed by the Chairs of the 
Education Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
Id. 
 137 Based on a 2012 survey conducted on seventy public Tennessee schools whose 
students used personal devices in the classroom, 43% of the participating schools used 
PC laptops, 22% used Apple iPads, 17% used netbooks, 12% used Apple Mac laptops, 
and about 6% used some other form of electronic device in the classroom. Doug Wright, 
Digital Textbooks in K-12 Schools, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION 
ACCOUNTABILITY, TENNESSEE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, JUSTIN P. WILSON, at 
3–4 n. F (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/Digital%20Textbooks.pdf (citing a survey 
conducted by the Technology in Education Survey System at the Center for Research in 
Education Policy at the University of Memphis, 
http://www.crepsurveys.net/TESS/StateUserHomepage.jsp?public=1 (accessed Sept. 25, 
2013)). While Tennessee recently enacted an education law in 2014, it does not address 
the interactions between schools and third-party operators. See H.B. 1549, 108th Gen. 
Assemb. (Tenn. 2013). 
 138 See T.C.A. § 49-1-703 (2014). 
 139 See WILLIAMSON COUNTY SCHOOLS, INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY: BYOT 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Mar. 8, 2012) [hereinafter BYOT Q&A], 
http://www.wcs.edu/wp-content/pdf/InstructionalTechnology/BYOTQA.pdf. This 
program allows students in grades 3–12 to either bring a portable electronic device 
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Under this program, each student is assigned a Gmail email 
account and uses Google Docs140—a type of cloud computing 
that requires interaction with online service providers. Such a 
program is exactly the type that requires the protection of laws 
like COPPA, SOPIPA, the SUPER Act, or Delaware’s Student 
Data Privacy Protection Act. Since the state of Tennessee has 
not passed any legislation guiding the school districts in such a 
manner, the Williamson County school district itself created its 
own policies to govern the BYOT initiative.141 While these 
policies are strict and require great levels of school monitoring, 
they differ from other school districts—like Shelby County 
School District. The Shelby County policies provide a more 
exhaustive list of the actions that can and cannot be taken by 
students and other users generally.142 Williamson County is 
more governance based while Shelby County is more 
prohibition based. On its face, it seems that the Shelby County 
School District offers more protections for students than the 
Williamson County School District. If states in similar 
situations want to provide uniform protection for all school 
children and avoid a patchwork of inconsistent district policies, 
 
with full Internet capabilities or check out a device owned by the school in order to 
enhance classroom learning—including smartphones, iPads and tablets, iPods, laptops, 
netbooks, and eReaders. Id.; see also WILLIAMSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
ACCEPTABLE USE, MEDIA RELEASE, AND INTERNET SAFETY PROCEDURES, at 6 
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON INTERNET SAFETY PROCEDURES], http://www.wcs.edu/wp-
content/pdf/BoardPolicies/4406p.pdf. 
 140 BYOT Q&A, supra note 139. 
 141 According to the district’s “Acceptable Use, Media Release, and Internet 
Safety Procedures,” students must remain connected to the Williamson County School’s 
guest network at all times in order to be monitored by teachers for safety reasons. 
WILLIAMSON INTERNET SAFETY PROCEDURES, supra note 139, at 2. As long as the child 
is connected to the district’s network, the district is able to restrict and filter the 
information that the student is allowed to access. Id. Additionally, the district reserves 
the right to collect and examine a student’s device if there is a reasonable suspicion 
that the student is violating school policy or the law. Id. 
 142 See Student Access Release and Authorization Form, SHELBY COUNTY BOARD 
OF EDUCATION, 
http://www.scsk12.org/schools/whitestation.ms/site/documents/StudentInternetAgreem
ent.pdf. For example, the policy states, “Students shall not transmit personally 
identifiable or personal contact information about themselves or others, except the 
student’s e-mail address, without prior consent by the parent and the teacher. 
Personally identifiable or personal contact information shall include name, address, 
telephone number, photograph, social security number, school name, and classroom.” 
Id. at 4. Additionally, the policy states, “The [Memphis City Schools (MCS)] network 
may be used only for educational and professional purposes consistent with the MCS’s 
goals. Commercial use (advertisements, business logos, etc.) of the MCS network is 
prohibited, unless specifically permitted in writing by the Department of 
Communications.” Id. at 5. 
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then they should adopt legislation that both expressly prohibits 
potentially harmful actions by third-party operators and 
provides rules of governance, which school districts must follow 
in order to ensure that each student is protected. Since federal 
attempts have failed to provide adequate protection for 
students in these situations, a combined prohibition-
governance approach is likely the best method of ensuring data 
privacy protections at the state level. 
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY APPROACH FOR STATES 
 The best approach for a state in constructing new 
legislation is to implement unambiguous guidelines, clear 
prohibitions, and a workable governance plan.143 The ultimate 
goal, as executed in Washington,144 should be not only to ensure 
a student’s privacy protection while interacting online in the 
classroom, but also to create a level of transparency for all 
parties—students, schools, third-party operators, and 
parents.145 All parties should be aware of the rights afforded to 
students, the prohibited behaviors of a third-party operator, 
and the enforcement responsibilities of the school. Therefore, in 
order to avoid a COPPA-like situation where it is unclear when 
consent is needed, who may give consent, and who is 
responsible for double-checking that consent has been properly 
obtained, the following proposals will provide strict guidelines, 
leaving no room for such questioning. A state statute following 
this prohibitive-governance approach will likely create 
uniformity in states with a patchwork of varying district 
policies. 
 
 143 See Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in 2015, and What is 
Next?, supra note 128, at 3; see also Mutkoski, supra note 2, at 530–32 (discussing the 
best practices that should be implemented in educational institutions for cloud 
computing practices). 
 144 See S.B. 5419, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3–5 (Wash. 2015). For example, 
Washington’s SUPER Act states, “School service providers shall provide clear and easy 
to understand information about the types of student personal information they collect 
and about how they use and share the student personal information,” and “School 
service providers must obtain consent before using student personal information in a 
manner that is materially inconsistent with the school service provider’s privacy policy 
or school contract for the applicable school service in effect at the time of collection.” Id. 
at §§ 3(1), 4(5). 
 145 Most parents do not know what the student data privacy laws entail, 
therefore, creating transparency is critical. See Beyond the Fear Factor, supra note 2, at 
14 (finding that 54% of parents “do not know anything about federal laws that restrict 
what public schools can do with their child’s information.”). 
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A. Prohibitive Proposals 
One way to eliminate ambiguous interpretation is through 
clearly-worded guidelines and prohibitions. Because this 
proposal deals exclusively with the interactions between 
students and third-party operators, creating complete 
prohibitions allows for easy enforceability. Such unambiguous 
language will not only make the restrictions understandable, 
but it will also create transparency so all parties involved know 
what to expect for a legal, online classroom interaction to occur. 
The following provisions should be included in a state’s 
legislative proposal or amendment in order to ensure that a 
child receives complete protection from illegal collection of 
personal information, sale of personal information, or identity 
theft while using classroom applications in school. 
1. “In a K–12 institution,146 no operator shall knowingly engage 
in targeted advertising, sell a student’s information, or use a 
student’s personal information147 for any purpose other than the 
educational purpose for which the operator was contracted, 
unless disclosure is made for reasons required by law or court 
order.”  
Prohibitions should be straightforward and should not 
provide opportunities for evasion.148 This provision does not 
allow an operator to engage in any commercial purposes while 
providing services to students within a school, offering absolute 
protection for students. This absolute prohibition also 
eliminates any of the previous confusion caused by the need to 
obtain “verifiable parental consent” so that the operator may 
engage in commercial activities.149 A list of exceptions would 
 
 146 Instead of imitating COPPA, state legislators should make the law applicable 
to all students in elementary through high school. This age range promotes not only 
equal protections for all minor students, but also uniformity with other existing 
education privacy laws, thus eliminating any kind of confusion. 
 147 The definition of “personal information” should mirror that found in 
Delaware’s law, including not only a list of physical information—such as residential 
address—but also the different ways in which “personal information” is created, such 
as through an online profile created by the student while using the operator’s service. 
See Student Data Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at § 
8102(A)(16) (Del. 2015). 
 148 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22584 (2014). SOPIPA does not include an 
extensive list of exceptions, as seen in COPPA (15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2)), thus making 
clarity and enforceability difficult. 
 149 See supra Part III(A). 
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leave states with the same problems that already exist under 
federal law. Forming such a strict and specific law will prevent 
both inconsistent interpretation and potential violations of 
student privacy. 
2. No operator shall refuse to delete a student’s information if 
the student or the student’s parent requests the removal of such 
information from the operator’s control. 
Borrowing from the proposed Do Not Track Kids Act of 
2015, this proposed provision creates an “eraser button” to 
allow a student’s personal information to be deleted upon 
request.150 Such an option gives not only the student control 
over his or her information, but also allows parents to exercise 
their right of parental control over their minor child’s 
interactions. Having an “eraser button” requirement ensures 
that only operators with non-commercial intentions that are 
willing to leave control in the hands of the students and their 
parents are allowed to contract with schools for interactive 
classroom purposes. 
3. Any third-party operator that wishes to contract with a 
school for educational purposes must disclose all collection 
policies. School districts must approve the operator’s collection 
policies before the operator may engage with the students.  
This provision draws from The Student Digital Privacy and 
Parental Rights Act of 2015, which requires operators to 
publicly list what type of data they collect, how it is used, and 
whether it is shared in a clear and easy-to-understand 
manner.151 Making such policies available to schools before any 
contract agreement is entered into is the best way for the 
school to prevent the possibility of any privacy violations. In 
addition, it provides the greatest amount of transparency, not 
only between the school and the third-party operator, but also 
between the third-party operator and parents since the school 
must also relay the operator’s collection policies to the 
 
 150 See H.R. 2734, 114th Congress, at § 6(b)(1) (2015–2016) (stating that no later 
than one year after the enactment of the Act, the commission must promulgate a rule 
“to implement mechanisms that permit a user . . . to erase or otherwise eliminate 
content or information submitted . . . that is publicly available . . . and contains or 
displays personal information of children or minors.”). Additionally, the operator must 
make users aware of the mechanism. Id. 
 151 H.R. 2092, 114th Cong. at § 3(b)(3) (2015). 
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parents.152 Having clear-cut guidelines and prohibitions is 
likely the most effective way to eliminate ambiguous 
interpretations. 
B. Governance proposals 
Governance and enforcement procedures are also crucial in 
ensuring that the protective measures in place remain 
effective. Since the students’ interactions with the operators 
take place within the classroom, it is logical that the majority 
of enforcement responsibilities should fall on the school. Unlike 
COPPA, which makes it the responsibility of a third-party 
operator to ensure that proper consent is obtained, this 
proposal requires that the school take extra preventative 
measures to ensure that violations are avoided. Involving 
schools heavily in governance is the best way to create 
transparency and keep operators in check. Because parents 
already entrust schools with their child’s physical safety, 
trusting schools with children’s online safety is not an 
unrealistic expectation. States should consider the following 
provisions to improve their enforcement methods and keep 
their new restrictions effective. 
1. The Board of Education shall establish a Student Data 
Privacy Task Force to research and make recommendations 
regarding the development and execution of current student 
data privacy laws and policies.  
Creation of an enforcement task force is another way in 
which schools can ensure that their students are receiving 
adequate protection. Like Delaware and Utah, states should 
create a privacy task force specifically designated to oversee 
school district compliance with state law and the school’s 
specific privacy policies.153 The purpose of the task force is “to 
study and make findings and recommendations regarding the 
development and implementation of a comprehensive 
framework to govern the privacy, protection, accessibility, and 
use of student data within and as part of the State’s public 
 
 152 See infra Part IV(B)(2)(3). 
 153 See Student Data Privacy Protection Act , S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. § 3 (Del. 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1-711 (2015) (repealed by Laws 2016, c. 
221, § 18, eff. May 10, 2016 (H.B. 358), 
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title53A/Chapter1/C53A-1-S711_2015051220150512.pdf). 
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education system.”154 Creating a task force removes the 
enforcement burden from teachers and school administrators 
who have other administrative duties to uphold. Each member 
of the task force must be properly educated and trained in 
technology and privacy law before holding a position. 
Legislators should look to Delaware’s Student Data Privacy 
Protection Act to determine what individuals may best suit the 
position.155 With a designated enforcement task system in 
place, schools can seek to ensure that their students are better 
protected. 
2. Any teacher or school administrator who intends to allow 
students to access an online service for educational purposes 
while at school must participate in a certified student-data 
privacy course at least once a year.  
Without proper training and understanding, both school 
districts and teachers may lack the expertise and knowledge of 
the law required to make a completely informed decision, and 
may enter into contracts with operators that are in violation of 
relevant student-data privacy law.156 Since it is usually 
individual teachers who make the initial decision to use an 
operator’s services,157 it would be highly irresponsible if the 
decision-maker selected a service without ensuring the proper 
protections are in place. Therefore, any legislative effort 
presented by states should require teachers to participate in a 
mandatory student privacy course at least once a year.  
3. Any teacher or school administrator who intends to allow 
students to access an online service for educational purposes 
while at school must provide parents with the operator’s 
collection policies and receive consent prior to the introduction 
of the online service to the students in the classroom for its use.  
This provision stems from the basic notion that parents 
should maintain control over their child’s interactions. If a 
parent thinks that a particular activity may be harmful to his 
or her child’s privacy, that parent should have the ability to 
 
 154 Student Data Privacy Protection Act, S.B. 79, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
§ 3 (Del. 2015). 
 155 See Id. 
 156 See Finch, supra note 100. 
 157 See id. 
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disallow the child’s participation.158 Creating a provision that 
keeps parents abreast of an operator’s collection policies is one 
of the most obvious ways of promoting transparency.  
4. Each teacher or school administrator who engages students 
in online classroom interactions must keep a current log—that 
includes all services a student interacts with and the third-
party operator’s collection policies—in the event a parent or 
other authorized school administrator requests review of a 
student’s interactions.  
This provision seeks to create complete transparency 
between third-party operators, schools, and parents. Allowing 
for a quick reference is extremely helpful in both keeping track 
of the risks a student may face and for an inspection by an 
enforcement task force. Maintaining a log of all the services 
students use enhances the school’s ability to closely govern the 
interactions between operators and students. By following 
these suggested guidelines, individual states will be able to fill 
the gaps left in the relationship between third-party 
contractors, students, parents, and schools. Such legislation 
will ensure that a child receives better protection from the 
illegal actions by third-party operators while using classroom 
applications in school. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Students must be protected from unwanted and illegal 
collection of their personal information. Although using 
technology is a great way for teachers to track student progress 
and to prepare students for their future technology-driven 
lives, it produces both risk for potential harm and places a 
greater level of responsibility on a school to protect its 
students. Current federal legislation (including COPPA) and 
recent federal legislative attempts have failed to adequately 
provide clear guidance for interactions between third-party 
providers and students in the classroom. Unfortunately, such 
federal laws are extremely confusing, difficult to apply, and are 
not strictly enforced, which has led to a heightened risk of 
 
 158 See generally Every Student Succeeds Act, 114 P.L. 95, 129 Stat. 1802 § (e)(2) 
(2015) (providing that parents may opt their child out of testing). This new federal law 
demonstrates that parents should still have control over their child’s education. 
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student privacy violations in the classroom. All states—
particularly ones without laws governing classroom 
interactions—should adopt prohibitive and governance 
provisions to promote 1) an absolute, unambiguous protection 
of student privacy, 2) greater responsibility on schools for 
enforcement, and 3) transparency amongst third-party 
operators, schools, students, and parents. With the guidance 
and enforcement policies in the hands of the states, the risk of 
illegal collection and use of students’ personal information will 
become more manageable. 
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